in war tactics and
operations for naught if
strategy is flawed
Of course, in war tactics and operations are for naught if the strategy is flawed.
British General Sir Garnet Wolseley encouraged colonial commanders to seize what the enemy prized most.
Gallwell counselled offensive action and dramatic battles because he believed it the best way to demonstrate the ‘moral superiority’ of the European.
This worked best against a foe with a fairly cohesive system – a capital, a king, a standing army, a religious bond — some symbol of authority or legitimacy which, once overthrown, discouraged further resistance.
But that was easier said than done.
Indigenous societies might be too primitive to have a centralized political or military system, or to assign value to the seizure of a city like Algiers or Kabul.
Insurrections against both English and Spanish rule in the New World began in the cities.
Efowever, the ability to control major cities did not win the war for either power, and in fact weakened them by forcing them to scatter their forces.
Shamil would pull his population deep into the mountains and force the Russians to attack fortified villages organized in depth, while he simultaneously slashed at their greatly extended supply lines, a tactic which Mao successfully replicated against Ghiang’s ‘encirclement’ campaigns of the early 1930s.
And while the Russians might eventually take these villages after desperate fighting, their casualties were such that victory was gutted of strategic significance and they were inevitably forced to retreat through hostile country.
From Wars of empire by Douglas Porch, (London: Cassell, 2000), as part of Cassell’s History of Warfare Series, John Keegan, General Editor.
In this cartoon from Leslie’s on March 7, 1864, the broom labeled “Grant” replaces the worn-out brooms of McClellan, Hooker and Pope after Grant’s victories had made it clear he should be the Union leader.
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